Constitutional Law--Refusal to Renew Appellant\u27s Passport to Travel in Certain Areas Held Immune from Judicial Review (Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 34 
Number 2 Volume 34, May 1960, Number 2 Article 13 
May 2013 
Constitutional Law--Refusal to Renew Appellant's Passport to 
Travel in Certain Areas Held Immune from Judicial Review 
(Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1960) "Constitutional Law--Refusal to Renew Appellant's Passport to Travel in 
Certain Areas Held Immune from Judicial Review (Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959))," St. 
John's Law Review: Vol. 34 : No. 2 , Article 13. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss2/13 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS
clearly defined, but it is apparent that the application of isolated act
statutes to impose jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis
of a single contract to be performed within the state satisfies due
process if there has been "substantial minimum contact" between the
defendant and the forum, and defending the action is not an unreason-
able burden.
Although the holding of the principal case is predicated upon a
cause of action arising out of the performance of a single contract
within the state, the Minnesota Court took into consideration addi-
tional corporate activities related to that contract before concluding
the requirements of due process had been satisfied. The minimal
contacts of defendant with the forum represent a degree of activity
barely sufficient to fall within the limitations prescribed by the
Supreme Court as the present scope of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - REFUSAL TO RENEW APPELLANT'S
PASSPORT TO TRAVEL IN CERTAIN AREAS HELD IMMUNE FROM
JUDICIAL REvIEw.-Appellant newspaper correspondent applied for
renewal of his passport which contained a restriction against travel
to certain areas with which the United States does not have diplo-
matic relations. Appellant had violated this restriction on his original
passport and refused to commit himself to abide by it in the future.
The Secretary of State refused to issue the passport. The United
States Court of Appeals, in affirming the judgment of the District
Court, held, the designation of certain areas in the world as "trouble
spots" and the concomitant restriction upon American travel therein
is a part of the President's conduct of foreign affairs as delegated to
the Secretary. The basis of the restriction is military, political, and
geographical, not personal, and the President's discretion in such
affairs is immune from judicial review. Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d
905 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
In English law, man's natural right to travel has been virtually
unquestioned for centuries. The Magna Carta in 1215 asserted this
right of free men against the right of the monarch to restrict them
to the kingdom I and, by the time of Blackstone little, if any, thought
was given to the notion that one of His Majesty's subjects would
have any restrictions placed upon his travel-within or without the
kingdom. 2 The American colonists undoubtedly shared this view
and article four of the Articles of Confederation stated it expressly.2
I MAGNA CARTA ch. 42 (1215).
2 1 BLAcKsToNE, COMMENTAIES *134.
3 See CHAFFFF, TaREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION 162-213(1956).
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Despite the fact that the right to freedom of locomotion was not ex-
pressly incorporated into the Constitution (as were the freedoms of
speech, press and religion), it played a vital role in the early growth
and development of the United States.4  When the question of free-
dom of movement between the states was encountered by the
Supreme Court in 1941, 5 it was held to be a right guaranteed by
the "commerce clause" of the Constitution.
The passport, in its earliest international usage, was granted as
a safe-conduct guarantee to foreign ambassadors or alien enemies. 6
United States passports were, at first, merely political documents
identifying the bearer as an American citizen and requesting his safe
passage through foreign countries.7 In contrast to their present
mandatory character, passports were originally devised solely as aids
to the traveler. They were issued, prior to 1856,8 by cities, states
and notaries public as well as the federal government, 9 as mere
courtesies and conveniences and were not required 10 for travel abroad
until World War I in 1918.11 At that time it was made unlawful to
enter or leave the country without a passport during time of war.12
The Secretary of State was authorized to issue them in his discretion
in accordance with rules prescribed by the President.'3
The State Department codified 14 its passport regulations and
the President affirmed them.15  The importance of the passport in-
creased greatly in 1941 when it was declared a necessity for foreign
travel, not only during war, but also in time of national emergency
proclaimed by the President. 6 This is of particular import since
the country has been in constant state of war or national emergency
since that time.17 The statutory history of the passport ends with the
Act of 1952 which enabled the Chief Executive to place whatever
other restrictions on passports as he should find the "interests of the
4 Ibid.
5 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) ; accord, Crandall v. Nevada,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867) (concurring opinion).
6 Jaffe, The Right to Travel: The Passport Problem, 35 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
17 (1956).
7 Urtetiqul v. D'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 699 (1835).
8 11 Stat. 60 (1856) "[Tlhe Secretary of State shall be authorized to
grant and issue passports . . .. " (Emphasis added.) (amended by 44 Stat. 887,
2Z U.S.C. §211a (1958)).
9 3 MooM, INTERNATIONAL LAw DIGEST § 493, at 862 (1906).
10 For the few exceptions see THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CommirE To
STUDY PASSPORT PROCEURES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY
OF NEw YORE, FREEDOm TO TRAvEL 7-8 (1958).
"140 Stat. 559 (now 66 Stat. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185) (1918).
12 Ibid.
13 44 Stat. 887, 22 U.S.C. §211a (1958) : "The Secretary of State may grant
and issue passports . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
14 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.1-51.170 (1958).
15 Exec. Order No. 7856, 3 Fed. Reg. 681 (1938).
1655 Stat. 252 (1941) (now 66 Stat. 190. 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1958)).
17 Pres. Proc. No. 3004, 18 Fed. Reg. 489 (1953).
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United States" require.18 The authority granted under this legis-
lation was promptly delegated to the Secretary of State.19
Unquestionably the nature of the passport, at least to the mind
of the State Department, had changed from a merely ancillary docu-
ment to an effective means of controlling exit from the United
States.20  The heightening of the "cold war" prompted an exercise
of the Secretary's discretion and an attempt on his part to deny
passports to several persons, particularly those who were allegedly
members of, or associated with, the Communist Party.21 The par-
ticular desirability of concealing the sources of information and the
identity of informers, made these denials almost summary, leaving
the applicants with little or no chance of attacking the decision or
even determining the precise grounds for refusal.2 2
In Bauer v. Acheson,2 3 the court rejected the government's con-
tention that the right to deny a passport was a purely foreign affair
(and thus a non-justiciable question). Although stating that the
right to travel was a substantive right, the court did not pass on the
constitutionality of the broad discretion vested in the President in
withholding passports 24 but decided on the issue that the applicant
was entitled to a hearing as a matter of procedural due process. 25
Again in Nathan v. Dulles,26 the time consuming and procedurally
doubtful method the State Department had established for granting
hearings and appeals was held to be other than that which the law
"contemplates and guarantees." 27 The Department's awareness of
the uncertain ground upon which it was treading at this time was
evidenced by the apparent fact that usually one had only to apply
for a passport, go through the appeal procedure, and, upon denial,
commence suit in the federal court-whereupon the Department
promptly issued the document.28
All this time, the courts, while not denying the Secretary's
right to refuse the passport,2 9 were prevented by procedural or tech-
nical questions from passing on the constitutionality of the issue. In
the Schachtnian v. Dulles case,30 the court recognized the right to
travel as a natural right subject to the protections of liberty guar-
18 66 Stat. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1958).
19 Pres. Proc. No. 3004, 18 Fed. Reg. 489 (1953).
20 See Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F2d 561, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
21 Comment, 61 YALE, L.J. 171, 193 (1952).
22 Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 COLUm. L. Rav. 47, 66-72
(1956).
23 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
2466 Stat. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1958).2 5 Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 452 (D.D.C. 1952).
26 129 F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C. 1955).
27 Id. at 952.2 8 Boudin, supra note 22, at 72.
29 See, e.g., Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 451 (D.D.C. 1952).
30225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
19601]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
anteed by the Fifth Amendment. But the court gave only the ruling
sought-that the Secretary's reasons were legally insufficient.
The Act of 1952 was placed squarely before the court in Kent
v. Dulles and Briehl v. Dulles, decided in the same opinion,31 but
again its constitutionality was not questioned. The court declared
that the "discretion" given the Secretary by the Acts of 1856 and
1926, though broadly stated, had in fact been narrowly applied to
two general situations-determination of United States citizenship
and allegiance, and participation in illegal conduct. Therefore Con-
gress did not intend by the "interests of the United States" clause
to authorize an unbridled discretion to grant or withhold a passport
for any substantive reason the Secretary may choose. Clearly the
right to travel can not, at the present time, be restricted because of
one's personal beliefs and associations.
It should be noted that the grounds for denial in the instant
case were totally different from those asserted in the previous liti-
gations. "The basis of the restriction is not personal but is the mili-
tary and political situation in the designated areas." 32 Nor is this
concept of area restrictions unique. As far back as the War of 1812
travel to and from enemy zones without a passport was deemed a
crime.33 In the early part of World War I passports were stamped
invalid for use in the belligerent countries of Europe.34 And again
in the decade preceding the Second World War such restrictions
were placed respectively on Ethiopia, Spain and China.3 5 Even after
these blanket restrictions were laid down, however, exemptions were
granted to certain groups of individuals.3 6 Once the Court accepted
the claim that such designations and restrictions were foreign affairs
the issue was resolved, for it has long been held that the discretion
of the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs is purely a political
question involving absolute discretionary powers.3 7
The present laws affecting the issuance of passports are greatly
in need of clarification-both legislative and judicial. At present there
is no provision for restricting the travel of a particular individual
31 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1957) ; Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561
(1957) (Briehl joined with Kent as appellant in the Supreme Court action).
32 Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1959). (Emphasis
added.)
333 Stat. 199 (1815).
34III HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 526 (1942).
35 Id. at 531-33. Although the restrictions here prevented one from obtain-
ing a passport, they did not prevent egress from the country.
36 Id. at 531. But cf. THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITrEE TO STUDY
PASSPORT PROCEDURES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N v
YORK, FREEDOM To TRAVEL 57, wherein it is stated that too many such excep-
tions if granted today might amount to discrimination against those denied a
passport.
37 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); accord,
United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818) ; Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433 (1939) (dictum).
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whose exit might be seriously detrimental to the national security.
More specifically, a question arises where the disclosure of the rea-
sons for denying an individual's passport or the government's confi-
dential sources of information might be equally deleterious to the
country's welfare. It seems that some specific legislation could be
passed which would both relieve the government of this dilemma and
still effectively safeguard the right of the individual. Nonetheless,
until further specific legislation is passed, the Secretary's discretionary
power is limited to the areas in which it had been generally exercised
since 1856 and the regulations hinging upon the "interests of the
United States" clause have been substantially invalidated. 38 Just
how specific such legislation must be is presently a divided question.39
The Worthy case has affirmed the Secretary's right to place area re-
strictions upon travel for all Americans. Whether, and to what ex-
tent, an individual can be so restricted, are the still unanswered
questions which now await further legislation before the court has
an opportunity to consider them.
M
CONTRACTS-ECONOMIc DURE S-THREAT TO SELL PROPERTY
TO AN "UNDESIRABLE PARTY" HELD SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE
DuREs.-Defendant-builder and plaintiffs-purchasers entered into an
agreement calling for the construction of a house in the defendant's
housing development. The contract provided for the making of a
,cash down payment. The plaintiffs, after making the down payment,
desired to be released from the contract and recover the purchase
money paid. Upon defendant's refusal to release them, plaintiffs
allegedly threatened to resell the house to an "undesirable person"
for the purpose of damaging the builder's business unless he acceded
to the plaintiffs' terms. Defendant agreed but thereafter refused to
return the money. Plaintiffs sued on the release agreement. The
lower court held for the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Court reversed,
holding that if the threats were in fact made and the builder actually
believed they would be carried out and his will was thereby over-
come, he was justified in treating the original contract as breached
and was entitled to recover whatever damages resulted therefrom.
Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 57 N.J. Super. 278, 154 A.2d 625 (1959).
38 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1957) ; accord, Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
144 (1957).39See, e.g., THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY PASSPORT
PROCEDURES OF THE AssociATiroN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
FREEDom To TRAvL 81-86 (1958) ; Jaffe, The Right to Travel; The Passport
Problem, 35 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 17, 27-28 (1956); Boudin, The Constitutional
Right to Travel, 56 COLUTm. L. REv. 47, 72-77 (1956); Comment, 61 YALE L.T.
171, 198-201 (1952).
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